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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the core assumptions underlying the so-called multilevel perspective on 
sociotechnical transitions (MLP) stand up to scrutiny. The paper clarifies the explicit and implicit 
assumptions within the MLP about the nature of reality (ontology), the status of claims about that 
reality (epistemology), and the appropriate choice of research methods, and assesses the consistency 
of these with the philosophical tradition of critical realism. The paper highlights a number of 
weaknesses of the MLP, including: the ambiguous distinction between systems and regimes; the 
problematic conception of social structure; the use of theory as a heuristic device rather than causal 
explanation; the ambition to develop an extremely versatile framework rather than testing competing 
explanations; the tendency to incorporate an increasing number of theoretical ideas, while at the 
same time paying insufficient attention to the necessity or contingency of particular mechanisms; the 
reliance upon single, historical case studies with little use of comparative methods; and the rejection 
of potentially useful methodologies such as agent-based modelling. However, the paper concludes 
that there is sufficient ambiguity and flexibility in the MLP to accommodate changes to the 
underpinning assumptions as well as the use of a broader range of research methods. 
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1. Introduction 
Research in innovation studies is increasingly focused on the challenge of sustainability - and in 
particular, the threat posed by climate change. Given the scale of this challenge, it is clear that an 
effective response will require more than developing and adopting cleaner technologies. Instead, 
major changes will be required in multiple aspects of the energy, transport, food and other systems 
that form the basis of industrialised societies. Innovation research has therefore focused increasingly 
upon how these systems function and how they may undergo far-reaching change [1]. The growing 
literature on these so-called ‘sociotechnical transitions’ has a range of antecedents and takes a variety 
of forms, but has increasingly coalesced around a particular theoretical framework: the so-called 
multilevel perspective on sociotechnical transitions (MLP) [2]. 
The MLP seeks to explain highly complex, non-linear processes that unfold over many decades, involve 
multiple social and physical entities, have unclear boundaries in space and time and lead to uncertain 
and contingent outcomes. It seeks to track changes in complex systems at various levels and along 
several dimensions, and to explain those changes as the result of the alignment and mutual 
reinforcement of a variety of processes operating at both the micro and macro levels. To identify those 
processes, the MLP draws upon a large and growing range of social scientific theories, several of which 
employ different and potentially incompatible foundational assumptions (e.g. evolutionary economics 
and social constructionism). This theoretical development informs and is informed by a series of 
qualitative, historical case studies that typically focus upon single rather than comparative cases and 
rely primarily upon secondary data [e.g. 2,3].  
Since its inception in the early 2000s, the MLP has proved enormously successful, attracting interest 
from researchers from a wide range of disciplines and stimulating a wealth of theoretical 
developments and empirical applications.1 The policy implications of this work have proved more 
difficult to communicate, but initial success in the Netherlands [4] has been followed by broader 
interest, including from the OECD [5,6]. 
Given this range of activity, it is increasingly difficult to keep track of developments and to assess the 
contribution that the MLP has made. In this context, this paper seeks to take a step back. Instead of 
applying the MLP to new empirical topics or ‘enriching’ it with new theoretical ideas, the paper 
investigates whether the core assumptions of the MLP stand up to close scrutiny. This involves 
clarifying the explicit or implicit assumptions within the MLP about the nature of reality (ontology) 
and the status of knowledge claims about that reality (epistemology), together with the corresponding 
recommendations about methodology. These assumptions are insufficiently discussed by 
practitioners or users of MLP-based research (or in innovation studies more generally), and deserve 
more consideration. 
To achieve this, the paper introduces a particular philosophy of science, known as critical realism [7,8]. 
Although widely used within the social sciences, critical realism has yet to influence innovation studies. 
In crude terms, critical realism seeks to bridge some long-standing divisions within the social sciences 
- such as between positivism and interpretivism. More technically, critical realism combines an 
‘ontological realism’ (the claim that phenomena exist independently of our knowledge of them) with 
                                                          
1 Indicators of this interest include the establishment of an academic journal (Environmental Innovation and 
Societal Transitions) and research network (Sustainability Transitions Research Network) that prominently 
feature MLP-based research. 
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‘epistemological relativism’ (the claim that human knowledge is socially produced, historically 
transient and fallible) and ‘judgemental rationalism’ (the claim that there are rational grounds for 
preferring some explanations over others). [7]. The paper argues that critical realism can clarify some 
of the strengths and weaknesses of MLP-based research, including the coherence of claims about the 
nature of sociotechnical systems and the validity of causal explanations of sociotechnical transitions. 
To do this, the paper identifies some synergies and conflicts between the foundational assumptions 
of the MLP and those of critical realism, together with some limitations of MLP research methods. The 
tensions between the MLP and critical realism are important, but the paper suggests that the 
ambiguity and flexibility of the MLP allows room for reconciliation. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the MLP, illustrating its basic 
insights with the help of a practical example and summarising its three core analytical concepts - niche, 
regime and landscape. Section 3 provides a brief introduction to critical realism, highlighting core ideas 
such as the concept of emergence. Section 4 identifies the implicit ontology of the MLP and indicates 
a number of important difficulties, including the vagueness of the concept of a sociotechnical system, 
the persistent ambiguity between systems and regimes and the apparent reliance upon a theory of 
social structure (structuration) that effectively conflates structure and agency and equates the former 
with social practices. Section 5 does the same for epistemology and methodology, highlighting 
tensions between the use of MLP as a heuristic device and as a causal explanation, the lack of attention 
to the necessity or contingency of different causal mechanisms and the limitations of ‘process theory’ 
as a model for MLP-based research. Both sections also indicate how the MLP could be modified to 
address some of these limitations. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Sociotechnical systems and transitions  
The MLP begins with the observation that ‘societal functions’, such as personal transport, electronic 
communication, water supply and housing are provided by a cluster of social and technical entities 
that are collectively termed a sociotechnical system [2]. Relevant entities include technologies, firms, 
supply chains, infrastructures, markets and regulations. Sociotechnical systems develop over many 
decades, and the alignment and co-evolution of the different entities leads to mutual dependence and 
resistance to change [2,9,10]. Sociotechnical transitions are defined as major transformations in these 
systems. These typically involve major changes in the technologies that form the core of the system, 
but they also – and necessarily - involve interlinked changes in many other parts of the system.  
To make these ideas more concrete, take the example of the car-based transport system providing 
the societal function of personal mobility [10,11]. This system is centred on an individual artefact - the 
car- but this artefact is linked to and dependent upon multiple social and technical entities at a variety 
of levels. These include, but are not confined to: the global car industry and its many associated supply 
chains; the car maintenance and distribution network; the global oil industry and the associated 
infrastructure of oil wells, refineries, pipelines and fuel stations; the road infrastructure and associated 
industries; the patterns of land use that have developed around that infrastructure, including 
amenities and workplaces that are only accessible by car; the multiple institutions, regulations and 
policies associated with the production and use of cars; the engineering skills and knowledge built up 
over decades in a variety of domains; the technical associations, interest groups and other 
organisations that are active in these domains; the daily travel routines, behaviour and expectations 
of millions of car owners; and the symbolism and cultural norms that have become associated with 
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car-based mobility (‘car culture’) [12]. These different entities and practices coevolve and act together 
to shape the level and pattern of personal mobility, as well as the environmental impacts of that 
mobility [11].  
While individual entities within the car-based transport system are constantly undergoing incremental 
change, a transition to a more sustainable transport system is likely to require multiple entities to 
undergo more radical change - such as the substitution of internal combustion engines by battery-
electric motors, the replacement of petroleum infrastructures with electrical charging infrastructures, 
the development of industries and supply chains for batteries and other technologies (along with the 
decline of existing industries and supply chains), the integration of the transport system with smart 
electrical grids that may use electric vehicles for electricity storage, the development of new 
knowledge and skills within each of these areas and the adjustment of users to vehicles that perform 
differently, are recharged differently, have a shorter range and are potentially self-driving [10]. Hence, 
an improved understanding of how such transitions have occurred in the past could potentially inform 
efforts to transform existing systems in more sustainable directions [13-17]. 
Geels [18-20] and other authors [12,21-23] have described how sociotechnical systems evolve and 
become established, how they encourage incremental change along predictable trajectories and how 
their stability can obstruct more radical change. Sociotechnical systems frequently rest upon core 
technologies such as the internal combustion engine whose early evolution involves considerable 
uncertainty. Historical experience suggests that (contrary to the predictions of orthodox economics) 
apparently inferior technologies can become dominant when they obtain an early advantage that 
allows them to benefit from various positive feedback mechanisms - such as scale economies that 
reduce costs, lower prices and encourage increased demand; learning economies that improve 
product performance, increase product attractiveness and further reduce costs; and network 
economies that enhance value through the development of complementary goods and services 
[12,24-26]. As core technologies diffuse, other factors come in to play to reinforce their dominant 
position, such as: investments in supporting infrastructure (e.g. roads, pipelines, garages); increased 
knowledge and capabilities in relevant areas (e.g. motor engineering); the growing economic and 
political power of relevant groups (e.g. the car industry); the establishment of supportive 
organisations and institutional frameworks (e.g. professional institutions, labour unions, regulations); 
and the evolving habits, norms and aspirations of different consumer groups [12]. These 
interdependent and co-evolving entities combine to form economically significant and geographically 
extensive systems that becomes increasingly entrenched or locked-in, making it difficult for 
technologies and behaviours that diverge in various ways from the dominant system (e.g. electric or 
fuel cell vehicles, mass transit) to become established [24,27]. 
The MLP aims to understand the nature, characteristics and modes of functioning of these 
sociotechnical systems; the sources of inertia in those systems and the processes through which 
transitions to different sociotechnical systems may come about. To do so, the MLP combines ideas 
from evolutionary economics (e.g., variation and selection, path dependence, lock-in), science and 
technology studies (e.g. actor-networks, social construction of technology) and various traditions 
within sociology (e.g. structuration, social practices, social expectations). Informed by a series of 
historical case studies [e.g. 20,28,29,30], the MLP explains radical change as the result of interactions 
between three levels, namely: the system itself which may be encountering internal difficulties (or 
more specifically the rules and norms that guide the actors in the system, termed the ‘sociotechnical 
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regime’); the ‘niches’ in which radical innovations are being developed; and the exogenous socio-
economic ‘landscape’ that is imposing pressures upon the system. These are briefly elaborated below: 
 Regime: As indicated, the incumbent sociotechnical system refers to the dominant technologies, 
infrastructures, industries, supply chains and organisations associated with delivering a particular 
societal function. The actions of the social groups that create and reproduce these systems are 
influenced by rules, shared meanings, rules of thumb, routines and social norms. These more 
intangible elements are collectively termed the sociotechnical regime [18,20]- although as 
discussed in Section 4, there is ambiguity and inconsistency in the use of these terms. The regime 
is claimed to provide orientation and coordination to the activities of different social groups 
which, together with the social relationships between these groups, contribute to the stability of 
the sociotechnical system. Innovation in existing systems is mostly incremental and path 
dependent, owing to ‘lock-in’ effects such as sunk investments, economies of scale, vested 
interests and entrenched social norms. Taken together, these features make sociotechnical 
systems stable and resistant to change. However, over time it is possible that tensions will build 
up within a system that are difficult to resolve through incremental change and which begin to 
threaten its stability. For example, the car-based and oil-based transport system may be 
threatened by growing congestion and worsening urban air quality. 
 Niche: At any time there are typically several emerging technologies that differ in important 
respects from those dominant within the incumbent sociotechnical system (e.g. battery-electric 
vehicles, hydrogen fuel cells, autonomous vehicles). These ‘niche innovations’ usually perform 
poorly compared to the established technologies, are relatively expensive and find it difficult to 
compete [16,18,20]. In addition, they may lack appropriate infrastructure, require changes in user 
practices and be obstructed by existing regulations. But such innovations may be able to gain a 
foothold within particular applications, geographical areas or markets, or with the assistance of 
targeted policy interventions. As with regimes, niche innovations are created and reproduced by 
social groups working with shared rules, but in contrast to the dominant regime the relevant social 
networks are fragile and unstable and the rules are malleable and contested - often with several 
competing technologies, designs and visions. Niche innovations frequently fail, but in some 
circumstances can gain enough momentum to stabilise their configurations, improve their 
performance, reduce their cost, achieve more widespread adoption and trigger changes in other 
system elements. This requires a growing consensus amongst relevant social groups about the 
appropriate configuration and market potential of the relevant innovations, together with 
increased access to financial, political and other resources [31,32]. Under these conditions, the 
niche has the potential to ‘break through’ and to challenge the existing regime. 
 Landscape: The evolution of sociotechnical systems may be affected in various ways by the 
broader physical, political and economic environment, or landscape [18,20]. The landscape is 
largely beyond the control of the actors within the system, but it may influence the system through 
either gradual changes, such as shifts in cultural preferences, demographics, and macro-political 
developments, or through short-term shocks such as economic recessions. For example, 
fluctuations in oil prices and growing concerns about climate change are exerting pressure on the 
car-based transport system. 
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Case studies of previous socio-technical transitions2 suggest that niche innovations can break through 
when their growing internal momentum combines with growing tensions within the existing 
sociotechnical system and growing pressures on that system from the external landscape. In 
combination, these create ‘windows of opportunity’ for radical change. These changes go beyond the 
adoption of new technologies and include investment in new infrastructures, the establishment of 
new markets, the development of new social preferences and the adjustment of user practices and 
routines. These case studies indicate how, in the context of landscape pressure and internal tensions, 
successful niche innovations can trigger a series of inter-related technical, economic, social and 
cultural changes that may eventually combine to create a new and different sociotechnical system 
based around a different set of core technologies (see Figure 1). 
Since the initial application of this framework [20], it has been developed and elaborated in multiple 
ways. Although the narrative of niche-driven transitions remains dominant, the framework has been 
refined to incorporate a broader range of ‘transition pathways’ that differ in the nature and timing of 
the interactions between the three levels [34]. While the framework has informed an enormous 
amount of empirical research3, the bulk of this research has focused upon emerging niche innovations 
and the challenge of steering future transitions in more sustainable directions, rather than explaining 
the sources and dynamics of historical transitions [13-15,17,35]. Along the way, the framework has 
accommodated and attempted to synthesise a remarkably wide range of theoretical perspectives and 
concerns (see Section 6). But before the framework can be assessed, it is first necessary to outline the 
core features of critical realism. 
                                                          
2 For example: sailing ships to steam ships [18]; propeller to turbojet aircraft [3], horse-drawn carriages to 
automobiles [28], mixed farming to intensive pig husbandry [33]; and steam to electric power in factory 
organisation [30]) 
3 For example, by May 2017 Google Scholar had recorded over 2800 citations to one of the foundational papers 
[2].  
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Figure 1: Multilevel perspective on sociotechnical transitions  
 
Source: [2] 
3. Critical realism 
First developed by Bhaskar in the 1970s [7,8], critical realism4 is an influential philosophy of the natural 
and social sciences that has informed empirical studies in a variety of areas [37-46]. As a philosophy 
of science, critical realism cannot be used to assess the validity of particular theoretical claims, but it 
can be used to evaluate the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying those claims and 
the appropriate methodologies for investigating them. Adherents argue that critical realism offers a 
more persuasive account of the nature of reality (ontology) and the status of knowledge claims about 
that reality (epistemology) than do competing philosophies of science (Table 1) [47]. Owing to lack of 
space, this claim will not be defended here (readers should refer to Bhaskar’s original texts [7,8] and 
subsequent elaborations by other authors [47-50]). Instead, the subsequent sections will focus on the 
consistency between critical realism and the MLP. 
  
                                                          
4 This section describes the ‘classic’ critical realism developed by Bhaskar in his first two books [7,8]. Bhaskar 
subsequently developed ‘dialectical’ and ‘transcendental’ critical realism, but these ideas are far less accessible 
and have correspondingly proved far less influential [36].  
Time
Landscape  developments
  put pressure on existing regime, 
    which opens up, 
      creating windows
         of opportunity for novelties 
Socio-technical regime  is ‘dynamically stable’.
On different dimensions there are ongoing processes
New configuration breaks through, taking
advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’. 
Adjustments occur in socio-technical regime.
Elements are gradually linked together,
and stabilise in a dominant design.
Internal momentum increases. 
Small networks of actors support novelties on the basis of expectations and future visions.
Learning processes take place on multiple dimensions.
Different elements are gradually linked together in a seamless web.
New  socio-technical
regime influences 
landscape
Technological
niches
Socio-technical’
landscape
Socio-
technical
regime
Technology
Markets, user 
preferences
Culture
Policy
Science
Industry
External influences on niches
(via expectations and networks)
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Table 1 Competing philosophies of social science 
 Positivism Interpretivism Critical realism 
Ontology Independent and 
objective reality 
Causality indicated by 
constant conjunctions 
of empirical events 
Socially constructed 
reality 
Multiple realities 
possible 
Objective, stratified 
reality consisting of 
surface-level events and 
real entities with 
particular structures and 
causal properties  
Epistemology Knowledge generated 
by discovering 
general laws and 
relationships that 
have predictive 
power 
 
 
Emphasis on 
prediction  
Knowledge generated by 
interpreting subjective 
meanings and actions of 
subjects according to 
their own frame of 
reference 
 
Emphasis on 
interpretation 
Retroduction used to 
create theories about the 
entities, structures and 
causal mechanisms that 
combine to generate 
observable events  
 
Emphasis on explanation 
Methodology Quantitative 
methods, such as 
experiments, surveys 
and statistical analysis 
of secondary data 
Qualitative methods , 
such as ethnographies 
and case studies 
No preference for a 
particular method - 
choice depends upon the 
research question and 
the nature of the relevant 
entities and causal 
mechanisms. Mixed 
methods encouraged.  
Source: Based on [51] 
The following summary of critical realism is based upon the accessible introductions by Sayer [48], 
Collier [47], Popara [49], Elder Vass [50] and Danermark et al [37]. The original motivating question 
for Bhaskar was “what must the world be like for science to be possible?” [7]. His answer was that 
there must be an independently existing world of entities that have causal powers and liabilities, or 
more generally, causal properties [7,47]. When these causal powers and liabilities are triggered they 
act in combination to create events, some of which we observe. The objective of science is to uncover 
the nature and structure of these entities, to identify and explain their causal properties and to use 
this understanding to explain particular events in terms of contingent combinations of entities and 
properties. Critical realism accepts that scientific knowledge is provisional, fallible and historically 
relative (i.e. it accepts epistemic relativism), but nevertheless argues that knowledge can progress and 
that scientific methods can provide grounds for choosing between competing claims (i.e. it rejects 
judgemental relativism) [48]. Critical realism applies to both the natural and social sciences, although 
the differences in the nature of the relevant entities leads to corresponding differences in the status 
of knowledge claims and the appropriate choice of research methods [7,8]. 
A core distinction within critical realism is between the real, the actual and the empirical [47,48]. The 
actual is those events that occur in the world, while the empirical is the subset of events that are 
actually observed. Lying behind these events is the domain of the real which consists of entities of 
various forms. These entities may be physical (e.g. organisms, minerals), social (e.g. families, 
organisations, markets) or cultural (e.g. languages, ideologies) and they may or may not be directly 
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observed - although to support claims of their existence, their effects must be observed. Individual 
entities have particular causal powers (the capacity to act in certain ways) and particular liabilities (the 
susceptibility to particular types of change) as a consequence of their internal structure. So for 
example, water has the power to quench a fire, aircraft have the power to fly, a market has the power 
to make efficient use of resources and so on.  
Individual entities are wholes formed from a set of parts (i.e. other entities) that are related, or 
structured, in a particular way [48,50]. This structure ensures that the entity persists for a period of 
time, as well as endowing it with its unique causal properties. So for example, a university is formed 
from a number of other entities, both material and social (e.g. departments, academics, buildings, 
equipment, legal frameworks), whose structural relationships endow the university with the power to 
recruit staff, raise finance, conduct research, teach students and award degrees. In turn, these 
constituent entities are also internally structured and have their own causal properties.  
The relationship between two or more entities may either be necessary or contingent. For example, 
there is a necessary relationship between a tenant and a landlord, since a person or organisation 
cannot be a tenant in the absence of a landlord [48].5 In contrast, although the personal characteristics 
of the landlord may affect the tenant in various ways, they are a contingent feature of their 
relationship [48]. Structure may then be defined as the set of necessary relationships between the 
constituent parts of an entity. 
When actualised, the causal properties of an entity will tend to bring about certain events [48]. For 
example, when water is thrown upon a fire it will tend to put it out. But whether particular causal 
powers are actualised, and whether or not they bring about particular events, will depend upon a 
variety of other, contingent conditions - such as the intensity of the fire, the strength of the wind, the 
flammability of the relevant materials, and so on. Depending upon the circumstances, the same causal 
mechanism may lead to different events (e.g. the fire may or may not be quenched), and the same 
event may result from different causal mechanisms (e.g. the fire may be quenched by CO2 rather than 
water).  
Events in the world are typically the net result of the simultaneous operation of multiple causal 
mechanisms. Hence, an invariant association between particular causal mechanisms and particular 
types of event may only be expected under rather special conditions - namely when the relevant 
entities and mechanisms remain stable, together with the conditions under which those mechanisms 
operate. The experimental method in natural science aims to create such conditions and therefore to 
isolate the operation and to identify the effects of individual causal mechanisms. But such conditions 
are difficult to reproduce in the social world: first, because social entities and their associated causal 
properties are prone to change (e.g. people learn and change their behaviour) and second; because 
the contextual conditions influencing events are difficult or impossible to control (for). Hence, regular 
associations between underlying causal mechanisms and particular types of event are likely to be 
much less common in the social world. We may, however, observe partial regularities over more 
limited periods of time (such as the inverse relationship between the price of a good and the quantity 
                                                          
5 The relationship may not be symmetric however: for example, it is possible to be a landlord in the absence of 
a tenant. 
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sold within a market) which, when present, can assist in the identification of causal mechanisms 
[40,52,53]. 
These considerations lead critical realists to reject philosophical frameworks that understand causality 
as a regular succession of empirical events (‘if A then B’). Not only are such regularities relatively 
uncommon (especially within the social world), reliance upon them reduces our understanding of 
causality to the level of the empirical, rather than the real. Causality should instead be understood as 
an inherent property of entities, deriving from their internal structure and creating a tendency to 
produce particular outcomes. The identification of empirical regularities (e.g. through a regression 
model) may provide evidence for the operation of particular causal mechanisms in particular 
circumstances, but does not explain the mechanisms involved. Nor is the identification of such 
regularities a necessary precondition for causal explanation (although they certainly help) [38]. 
Instead, research methods such as case studies and ethnography may be more appropriate for 
uncovering the complex and contingent mix of entities and mechanisms that together explain 
particular events [37,48]. But whatever methodology is employed, the primary goal of science should 
be causal explanation.   
A central theme of critical realism is emergence. Entities are structured, and those structures are 
nested within other structures. Some of the causal properties of entities emerge from structured 
relations between their constituent entities, but are not possessed those constituents individually. To 
take the most commonly cited example, the power of water to quench fire emerges from the causal 
powers of hydrogen and oxygen, but is not reducible to them. Similarly, the power of a landlord to 
extract rent from a tenant emerges from the structural relationship between the two, and is not 
reducible to the characteristics of the individuals involved. While entities may have some properties 
that are simple aggregations of the properties of their constituent elements (e.g. the mass of water is 
reducible to the masses of hydrogen and oxygen), the definition of entities relies upon the existence 
of emergent causal properties that in turn derive from the necessary, structural relationships between 
their constituent parts and the interactions between those parts. Critical realism, therefore, is critical 
of reductionism in general and ‘methodological individualism’6 in the social sciences in particular. 
While reductionist explanations may sometimes be appropriate, they overlook the possibility of 
emergent causal properties. Critical realism further claims that emergent properties may ‘downwardly 
influence’ entities at a lower level. So for example, in carrying out a conversation a person is influenced 
by the signification, grammatical and other rules that emerge from the higher level entity of language.  
As can be seen from the above examples, critical realism is equally applicable to the behaviour of 
natural and social entities, but these also differ in important ways. In particular, social entities are 
bounded in space and time and their existence depends upon the activities of the people that they 
govern [8]. The latter, in turn, must have conscious or tacit understandings of the meaning and 
functioning of the relevant social entity (e.g. the English language, the university, the state) [48-50,55]. 
Critical realists have a distinctive perspective on social structure, although different authors provide 
different interpretations of this term [49,50,55-57]. A common theme is that social entities have 
emergent causal properties that derive from the necessary relations between the people (or social 
positions), artefacts and shared ideas of which they are comprised but which are mediated through 
                                                          
6 Described by Popper [54] as follows: "… All social phenomena, and especially the function of all social 
institutions, should always be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes etc., of human 
individuals, and that we should never be satisfied by an explanation in terms of so-called ‘collectives…”. 
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individual agency [50]. These social relations shape but do not determine the interests, resources, 
understandings and expectations of the constituent actors; and thereby their actions. The resulting 
structured interactions give the social entity causal powers - such as the power of a university to award 
degrees, or the power of an orchestra to play a symphony [50,58]. Social entities therefore enable, 
constrain and motivate the actions of individuals and are in turn either reproduced or modified by 
those actions. So for example, in choosing particular political strategies, a lobbyist will be influenced 
by the distribution of rights, obligations, interests and resources inherent in the relational structure 
of a capitalist market economy, but if her strategies are successful they may change the structure of 
that economy [59].  
Having summarised the core elements of both the MLP and critical realism, we can now examine the 
degree of consistency between the two. This will be achieved in two stages: first, by examining the 
ontological status of sociotechnical systems; and second, by examining the epistemological status of 
claims about those systems together with the associated research methodologies. This analysis 
uncovers a number of tensions, including: between systems and regimes; between heuristics and 
explanations and between necessity and contingency. 
4. Sociotechnical ontology  
Boundaries and properties  
The central constructs of the MLP are the sociotechnical system and the associated sociotechnical 
regime, since niches and landscapes are defined in relation to those systems/regimes. A critical realist 
interpretation of the MLP could be that sociotechnical systems constitute distinct entities, emergent 
from lower-level entities and with their own causal powers and liabilities. Sociotechnical systems 
consist of multiple, lower-level entities (e.g. firms, technologies, infrastructures) that are necessarily 
related in particular ways. These constituent entities, in turn, have their own causal powers and 
liabilities. However, relations and interactions between these constituent entities allow the system to 
function effectively as a whole and provide it with causal properties that would not exist in the absence 
of those relations and interactions.  
Whether this interpretation would be accepted by MLP researchers is unclear. Geels, for example, 
states that "… the multilevel perspective is not an ontological description of reality but an analytical 
and heuristic framework to understand technological transitions…” [18] (see Section 5). Also, it is 
unclear as to which of the properties of sociotechnical systems (e.g. stability, inertia) should be 
considered emergent and which should be considered as simply the aggregate outcome of one or 
more lower-level mechanisms - such as increasing returns. For example, researchers using tools such 
as systems dynamics or agent based modelling have shown how complex, aggregate patterns 
(including phenomena such as path dependence and tipping points) may result from the interaction 
of constituent entities following relatively simple rules [26,60].7 Outcomes such as these are 
sometimes termed ‘pattern’ emergence to distinguish them from the ‘ontological’ emergence 
required for the definition of a social entity [62]. Since such reductionist explanations may be sufficient 
                                                          
7 For example, in a classic study, Schelling [61] showed how extreme levels of racial segregation could result 
from individuals exercising relatively ‘mild’ preferences about neighbourhood choice.  
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to explain observed outcomes, claims for emergent properties need to be demonstrated rather than 
assumed.  
For the ontological status of sociotechnical systems to be adequately defended, it would be necessary 
to identify: the constituent parts (entities) of the relevant system; the necessary relationships between 
those parts; the emergent causal properties of the systems; the processes through which the 
constituent parts and relationships produce those causal properties; and the processes through which 
the systems become established and are maintained [50]. This in turn would require a clear definition 
of the societal functions that individual systems fulfil. But such a systematic approach is very 
challenging and rarely achieved - and the existing MLP literature falls short in a number of respects.  
One fundamental problem is that boundaries of individual sociotechnical systems and the societal 
functions they fulfil are typically left rather vague. For example, does the car-based transport system 
deliver the societal function of mobility, or car-based mobility or accessibility to particular 
destinations? Both mobility and accessibility are also delivered by other technologies and systems that 
share many elements with the car-based transport system, but also differ from it in important ways. 
Bus transport, for example, also requires a road network, together with associated rules (e.g. highway 
code) and organisations (e.g. highway maintenance) and is equally reliant upon the global oil industry 
and associated infrastructures, together with the knowledge and skills associated with motor 
manufacturing. So should bus transport be considered as part of the sociotechnical system of 
automobility, or a subsystem or a separate system? Similarly, cycle transport shares the road network 
together with the rules and norms of road use, and the latter also govern the interactions between 
cars and cycles. Hence, there may be nested and overlapping sociotechnical systems in different areas. 
But the criteria for identifying whether particular entities should be included or excluded from a 
system; whether particular relationships are necessary or contingent to the functioning of that system; 
and whether particular causal properties should be attributed to that system, a subset of that system 
or to something else remains rather poorly specified. For example, the oil industry is necessary for the 
functioning of car-based transport system and is also affected by actors within that system. But it is 
not clear whether it should be considered part of the automobility system or part of the broader 
landscape. 
In a similar manner, a sociotechnical transition may transform some parts of a system (e.g. industrial 
supply chains, knowledge and skills associated with engine manufacture) while leaving many other 
parts unchanged (e.g. road networks, highway codes, user practices). At the same time, technological 
and social changes may drive transitions within several systems simultaneously (e.g. the use of fuel 
cells for both car and bus transport, or the use of self-driving technologies for all forms of transport) 
and subsystems that are already well-established (and hence not niche) may gradually displace ‘higher 
level’ systems (e.g. mass transit displacing car travel). While such complexity could be considered an 
inherent feature of the social world, the looseness of the ‘sociotechnical system’ concept makes the 
choice of boundaries appear rather arbitrary - thereby potentially reducing the MLP’s explanatory 
power. This has implications, for example, for evaluating whether properties such as stability, 
resilience and inertia should be considered ‘ontologically emergent’ properties of a sociotechnical 
system, or merely ‘pattern emergent’ outcomes of a limited number of lower-level mechanisms, such 
as increasing returns. If the latter is the case, the concept of a sociotechnical system may not be 
necessary for causal explanation. 
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Systems and regimes 
A more fundamental ambiguity lies in the distinction between a sociotechnical system and a 
sociotechnical regime. While many authors use these terms interchangeably, Geels and others 
[14,20,33,63,64] draw a distinction between the two: 
“…System refers to tangible and measurable elements (such as artefacts, market shares, 
infrastructure, regulations, consumption patterns, public opinion), whereas regimes refer to 
intangible and underlying deep structures (such as engineering beliefs, heuristics, rules of 
thumb, routines, standardised ways of doing things, policy paradigms, visions, promises, social 
expectations and norms)….” [63] 
 
“… The sociotechnical regime forms the ‘deep structure’ that accounts for the stability of an 
existing sociotechnical system. It refers to the semi-coherent set of rules that orient and 
coordinate the activities of the social groups that reproduce the various elements of 
sociotechnical systems… Examples of regime rules are cognitive routines and shared beliefs, 
capabilities and competencies, lifestyles and user practices, favourable institutional 
arrangements and regulations, and legally binding contracts…” [63] 
The first quote is not wholly satisfactory from a critical realist perspective since it partly defines 
sociotechnical systems in terms of measures of things (e.g. market shares, public opinion) rather than 
constituent entities (e.g. firms, institutions). Both quotes define sociotechnical regimes in terms of 
underlying rules, but some of these rules (e.g. legally binding contracts) appear more ‘tangible’ than 
others (e.g. cognitive routines) and regulations are defined as part of the system in the first quote and 
part of the regime in the second (although both quotes are from the same paper). The focus on rules 
can be traced back to Nelson and Winter [65] who highlight how the cognitive routines of engineering 
communities encourage incremental innovation along particular trajectories (‘technological regimes’). 
Rip and Kemp [66] and Geels [18-20] widen this concept to include the rules that guide the activities 
of the other social groups associated with a technology - such as users, policymakers, financiers and 
suppliers - thereby renaming the concept ‘sociotechnical regimes’. However, the distinction between 
tangible elements (systems) and intangible rules (regimes) is not applied consistently within the MLP. 
Instead, sociotechnical regimes are sometimes defined as comprising three interlinked (tangible and 
intangible) components, namely: 
1. physical artefacts, such as machines, materials and infrastructures; 
2. social groups, such as engineers, firms, suppliers, universities, users and policymakers; and  
3. intangible rules, such as regulations, standards, cognitive routines and social norms [20,30]. 
 
This definition effectively subsumes the system within the regime. It is not clear, therefore, whether 
the ‘semi-coherent set of rules’ defines a sociotechnical regime that in turn structures a sociotechnical 
system, or whether the rules form part of a sociotechnical regime that also includes the sociotechnical 
system. But in either case, these rules are said to inform and coordinate the activities of the different 
social groups [18,20]. Building upon Scott [67], Geels [20] helpfully distinguishes between regulative, 
normative and cognitive rules (Table 2) and shows how these reinforce one another. For example, the 
enforceable laws regarding road use reinforce the social norms regarding considerate driving. But 
while it is often claimed that “…the rules of sociotechnical regimes account for the stability and lock-
in of sociotechnical systems…” the material features of sociotechnical systems (e.g. road 
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infrastructures, oil pipelines, garages) appear an equally important source of inertia. Hence, it would 
be more plausible to argue that the stability of sociotechnical systems derives from alignments and 
inter-linkages within and between their constituent physical artefacts, social groups and intangible 
rules (Table 3). There is no need to give the regime (defined as rules) any priority. 
Table 2 Different types of rule 
 Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Familiarity 
Mechanisms Coercive (e.g. 
punishment) 
Normative pressure 
(e.g. social sanctions) 
Learning, imitation 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported 
Examples Formal rules, laws, 
sanctions, protocols, 
standards, procedures 
Values, norms, role 
expectations, duty, 
codes of conduct 
Problem agendas, 
beliefs, bodies of 
knowledge, models of 
reality, categories, 
classifications, search 
heuristics 
Source: [20] 
Table 3 Sources of stability in sociotechnical systems 
Component Illustrative stabilising mechanisms 
Rules Focus on particular types of engineering problem and 
solution; shared expectations; established roles and patterns 
of interaction; shared customs, values and norms; technical 
standards 
Social groups Interdependent relationships between different 
organisations; social relations and obligations; economic 
interests; political lobbying activities 
Physical artefacts Capital intensity and longevity of infrastructures; sunk 
investments; economies of scale; network externalities 
Source: [20] 
 
In addition to the ambiguous definition of sociotechnical regimes, individual regimes are said to 
coordinate developments within several sub-regimes in areas such as science, technology, industry, 
policy, culture and markets (see Figure 1) [2,20]. Rules within these sub-regimes are said to be aligned 
with each other. For example, scientific and engineering knowledge about internal combustion 
engines (science sub-regime) is aligned with the organisation of the car industry and its associated 
supply chains (industry sub-regime) [20]. But the science, industry and other ‘sub regimes’ both extend 
to and affect multiple other sociotechnical regimes. Hence, there are overlaps and blurred boundaries 
between different sub-regimes as well as between different sociotechnical regimes and between 
regimes and systems. This creates confusion, along with the risk that causal mechanisms will be 
attributed to one level or to one regime, whereas in fact they belong to a different level or regime, or 
to the external landscape. 
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Structure and agency 
In the same way that the regime concept can be traced to Nelson and Winter, the idea that rules 
provide a ‘deep structure’ or ‘grammar’ for a sociotechnical system can be traced to Giddens’ 
structuration theory:  
 
"… regime rules are both medium and outcome of action (duality of structure). On the one 
hand, actors enact, instantiate and draw upon rules in concrete actions in local practices; on 
the other hand, rules configure actors…”  [68] 
 
However, structuration theory has been strongly criticised by critical realists [55,56,59,69-72] as part 
of a larger debate within sociology about the relationship between social structure and individual 
agency. This vast and seemingly endless debate cannot be addressed here, but the basic differences 
between the critical realist and ‘structurationist’ perspectives are summarised in Table 4. For critical 
realists, social structure is an emergent causal property of social entities, deriving from the necessary 
relations between their constituent parts [50]:  
 
“….We are dealing with a system of interlinked components that can only be defined in terms 
of the interrelations of each of them in an ongoing developmental process that generates 
emergent phenomena - including those we refer to as institutional structure. Emergent 
properties are therefore relational; they are not contained in the elements themselves and 
could not exist apart from them…” [69] 
 
These relations may be between the occupants of distinct social positions which in turn define their 
interconnections, resources, interests and incentives (e.g. between employer and employee) [59]. Or 
they may be between groups of people with shared expectations about what constitutes appropriate 
behaviour in different situations (e.g. between cyclist and car driver). While the first of these is more 
‘structural’, and the second more ‘cultural’, they may both be understood as emergent properties of 
social entities. For example, Elder Vass [68] uses the term ‘norm circle’ to refer to the group of people 
committed to endorsing and enforcing a specific social norm. In each case, the relevant structural (or 
cultural) relationships predate individual action; enable, constrain and motivate (but do not 
determine) that action; give predictability to that action; and are either reproduced or transformed 
by that action. Critical realism therefore understands social structure as something external to 
individuals and deriving from intentional relations between those individuals - along with relevant 
artefacts and symbols. Both people and structures have causal powers: the first through their agency 
(deployment of which requires interpretation, choice and strategy) and the second through 
encouraging, discouraging, enabling or constraining that agency. Neither can be reduced to the other. 
 
This arguably ‘common-sense’ view of social structure is very different from that proposed by 
structuration theory. For Giddens, structure exists entirely in people's heads: 
 
“…. Structure is….rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social 
systems. Structure only exists in memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, 
and as instantiated in action……” [73] 
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“….Structures exist in time-space only as moments recursively involved in the production of 
social systems. Structures have only a virtual existence….” [74] 
 
“…..Structures are not the patterned social practices that make up social systems, but the 
principles that pattern these practices……” [75] 
 
These passages are hard to interpret, but nevertheless serve to demonstrate that Gidden’s 
interpretation of social structure is fundamentally different from the critical realist interpretation. The 
more conventional notion of social structure - namely relationships between different social groups - 
forms part of Giddens theory but is labelled ‘social system’ instead [59]. Giddens claims that these 
social systems have no causal properties of their own, but are instead ‘structured’ by the internal 
‘rules and resources’ of participating actors. Causality derives not from the relationships within the 
social system, but from the repetitive rule-following behaviour of individuals. For Giddens, this 
internal, subjective behaviour is causally prior to the external reality of the social system; while for 
critical realists the reverse is the case (Table 4) [49,59]. Put another way, Giddens conflates structure 
and agency and equates the former with social practices [56,69]. 
Table 4 Contrasting perspectives on social structure 
Critical realism Structuration theory 
Structure is external to agents Structure is internal to agents 
Structure is the necessary, external 
relations between the constituents of 
larger social entities 
Structure is internal rules and resources 
Structure is objective Structure is intersubjective 
Social relations are prior to rule-following Rule-following is prior to social relations 
Behaviour is structured by social relations Behaviour is structured by culture 
Source: [49,50] 
 
This complex and long-standing debate is relevant here since the concept of structure as internal 
‘rules’ also appears to underpin the MLP. This is evident, for example, in the distinction between 
tangible sociotechnical systems (cf Giddens social system) and intangible sociotechnical regimes (cf 
Giddens rules and resources). It is also evident in the claims that regime rules: provide a ‘deep 
structure’ for sociotechnical systems, should be considered analytically prior to those systems and 
provide the primary source of stability for those systems. As such, the problems with Giddens 
structuration theory carry over into the MLP. 
 
However, the MLP is only partially informed by structuration theory and also incorporates ideas from 
a range of other areas. As a result, it is possible to interpret the empirical case studies in a way that is 
consistent with a critical realist view of social structure and emergent causal powers. For example, the 
following passage from Geels - which immediately follows a mention of structuration theory - appears 
entirely compatible with a critical realist ontology: 
 
“… Human agency, strategic behaviour and struggles are important but situated in the context 
of wider structures. Actors interact (struggle, form alliances, exercise power, negotiate and 
cooperate) within the constraints and opportunities of existing structures, at the same time 
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that they act upon and restructure those systems.… Structures not only constrain but also 
enable action, i.e. make it possible by providing coordination and stability…  ” [20] 
 
In addition, the MLP is continuously evolving and more recent publications place less emphasis on 
structuration theory and more upon other frameworks such as institutional theory. For example, Geels 
et al [76] note some weaknesses with structuration theory and highlight the work of a leading critical 
realist, Margaret Archer [55,56]. Hence, there appears to be sufficient ambiguity and flexibility within 
the MLP to allow it to be interpreted and developed in multiple ways. Moreover, the MLP consistently 
emphasises the material nature of sociotechnical systems - something that has also been emphasised 
by critical realists [58,62] but is largely missing from the sociological debate on agency and structure 
(including Giddens). This is crucial, since the physical constraints imposed by long-lived artefacts and 
infrastructures provide a primary explanation for the stability of sociotechnical systems (Table 3). 
Nevertheless, since Giddens’ interpretation of social structure is incompatible with critical realism, it 
seems inappropriate to the latter to ‘complement’ the former - as Geels et al [76] seek to do.  
 
In sum, while the MLP does not make strong ontological claims, there are several tensions between 
its implicit ontology and that of critical realism. These tensions could be reduced, however, by making 
a number of adjustments to the theory - such as dropping the distinction between systems and 
regimes. The next section will investigate whether there are similar tensions between the implicit 
epistemology of the MLP and critical realism.  
5. Sociotechnical epistemology and methodology 
MLP case studies are complex, descriptive, qualitative and multidimensional and therefore very 
different from the parsimonious, comparative and quantitative studies that dominate in areas such as 
economics. As a result the MLP provides little that would be recognised as ‘theory-testing’ by 
researchers in more positivist research traditions.8 This leads sociotechnical ideas to be resisted or 
neglected by such researchers, including many who work on innovation. While this tension derives in 
part from the MLP’s focus on highly complex processes operating over the long-term, it also reflects 
more fundamental disagreements about the status of social scientific knowledge, the processes 
through which such knowledge can be produced and the criteria by which it should be justified (i.e. 
epistemology). As with ontology, the implicit epistemology of the MLP has some affinities with critical 
realism, since both reject the core assumptions of positivism (Table 1). But there are also a number of 
tensions. 
Heuristics and explanations 
For critical realists, the objective of studying sociotechnical transitions should be to explain their 
sequence and outcomes in terms of complex and contingent conjunctions of entities, mechanisms and 
strategic decisions [77]. This involves conceptualising and describing the relevant entities and 
mechanisms and investigating how they combine to produce the observed outcomes [37]. In part, this 
is what MLP case studies seek to do. For example, in his study of the transition from horse-drawn 
carriages to automobiles, Geels’ [28] highlights a remarkably wide range of mechanisms including the 
increasing returns from technology adoption; political lobbying and strategic coalitions by groups with 
                                                          
8 Characterised, for example, by parsimony,  the focus upon measurable variables, the search for regularities 
across space and time and the use of quantitative techniques [77]. 
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shared interests (e.g. car, construction and cement companies); and path dependencies, such as 
gasoline cars building upon the existing fuel infrastructure for agricultural vehicles. Although these 
processes and mechanisms tend towards certain outcomes, there is contingency in how, when and in 
what way they combine, what the resulting outcomes are and how external ‘landscape’ changes affect 
those outcomes (although it is not clear whether something like suburbanisation should be considered 
part of the landscape or part of the transition). 
However, the MLP studies do not emphasise causal explanation in the same way or to the same extent 
as critical realism. Frequently, the MLP is described as a ‘heuristic device’ - a rather ambiguous term, 
defined in the dictionary of sociology as “…any procedure which involves the use of an artificial 
construct to assist in the exploration of social phenomena” [78]. An artificial construct is not the same 
as the real entities and mechanisms that critical realists seek to uncover - and this difference is 
reflected in accounts of how the MLP is used: 
“…..Frameworks such as the MLP are not ‘truth machines’… instead they are ‘heuristic devices’ 
that guide the analyst's attention to relevant questions and problems. Their appropriate 
application….help the analyst ‘see’ interesting patterns and mechanisms…..” [9] 
"… [heuristic perspectives] identify the relevant variables and the questions…All the 
interactions among the variables and the frameworks cannot be rigorously drawn. The 
frameworks, however, seek to help the analyst to better think through the problem…" (Porter 
[79], quoted in Geels [63]) 
Hence, while MLP case studies identify a wide range of causal mechanisms, the overall framework - 
and thereby the claims regarding the necessity of alignment between different mechanisms - appears 
rather loose. One consequence of this ‘looseness’ is that the MLP is remarkably adaptable. It has been 
applied to historical transitions as varied as the transition from sailing to steam ships (1780-1900) [20], 
the transformation of US factory production (1850-1930) [30] and the breakthrough of rock 'n' roll 
(1930-1970) [80]. Similarly, emerging ‘sustainable’ niches have been conceptualised as narrowly as 
car sharing [81] and as widely as renewable electricity [82]. Given the variations in spatial and 
temporal boundaries, the nature of the core (social or technical) innovations and the type of socio-
economic context, one would expect these case studies to reveal significant differences in the nature 
and relative importance of different causal mechanisms. But the framework claims to account for 
them all. When the evidence indicates the limitations of the standard ‘niche breakthrough’ model 
outlined in Section 2 (Figure 1), the MLP is modified to accommodate: for example by postulating 
alternative transition pathways (e.g. transformation, reconfiguration, technological substitution, de-
alignment/re-alignment, step-wise adjustment) [30,34], or by highlighting variations and linkages 
between different spatial scales [83]. Hence, the MLP is neither compared to nor tested against other 
theories, but instead continuously elaborated to accommodate evidence from different case studies. 
This would appear to make it closer to a heuristic device, or to a loose organising framework, than to 
an explanatory theory - with causal explanation resting instead upon ‘lower-level’ mechanisms such 
as path dependencies and increasing returns. But if that is the case, it weakens the argument that a 
sociotechnical system should be considered an emergent and causally significant entity that ‘aligns’ 
different processes, and that the interactions between niche, regime and landscape are a necessary 
condition for a transition to occur. 
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Necessity and contingency 
One way of understanding the MLP is to consider how it employs the different modes of scientific 
inference summarised in Table 5 [37]. Deduction and induction are the most familiar, but are 
insufficient for scientific practice since the former provides no knowledge of reality beyond the initial 
premises and the latter provides no knowledge of underlying structures and mechanisms. They must 
therefore be supplemented by abduction and/or retroduction - which aim to reinterpret empirical 
observations in the context of more general ideas:  
“……Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis and is the only 
logical operation which introduces any new idea….Deduction proves that something 
must be; Induction shows that something actually is operative; Abduction merely 
suggests that something may be…” [84] 
Table 5 Modes of scientific inference 
 Deduction Induction Abduction Retroduction 
Structure Deriving logically 
valid conclusions 
from given 
premises 
Deriving universally 
valid conclusions 
about a population 
from a number of 
observations 
Interpreting and re-
contextualising 
phenomena within a 
conceptual framework 
or set of ideas.  
Reconstructing the 
conditions for the 
observed 
phenomena to be 
what they are.  
Issue What are the 
logical 
conclusions of 
the premises 
What factor(s) 
common to 
observed entities are 
also true of a larger 
population 
What meaning is given 
to something 
interpreted within a 
particular conceptual 
framework 
What qualities must 
exist for something 
to be possible 
Strength Guides logical 
derivations and 
assessments of 
validity 
Guides empirical 
generalisations 
Guides interpretation 
of the meaning of 
events in relation to a 
larger context 
Guides 
interpretation of 
underlying 
structures and 
mechanisms that 
cannot be directly 
observed  
Limitations Does not say 
anything new 
about reality 
beyond what is in 
the premises 
Risk of drawing the 
wrong conclusion 
(black swans), 
unable to produce 
knowledge of 
underlying 
structures and 
mechanisms 
No fixed criteria to 
assess the validity of 
the conclusions 
No fixed criteria to 
assess the validity 
of the conclusions 
Required skills Logical reasoning 
ability 
Statistical ability Creativity and 
imagination 
Ability to abstract 
Source: [37] 
 
The MLP relies primarily upon abduction - namely, reinterpreting a set of empirical observations in 
the light of particular a theoretical framework, with the aim of discovering connections and relations 
between those observations [37]. This is similar to a doctor inferring the presence of the disease from 
a group of symptoms, but provides no ultimate way of deciding whether the framework is valid. While 
a doctor may consider several possible diseases, empirical studies using the MLP consider only a single 
overarching framework, but with variations in the relevant processes and the way in which they 
combine. Relatively little use is made of deduction or induction. 
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In contrast, critical realism places greater emphasis on retroduction – a term that , along with 
abduction, was first introduced by Pierce [37,84]. Although there is considerable ambiguity in the use 
of these terms, their Latin roots (ab = leading away from, retro = deliberately leading backwards) 
indicate that: "… retroduction is a deliberate and recursive process involving more than the making of 
an abductive inference…" [85]. Within critical realism, retroduction is interpreted as: a) taking a set of 
empirical observations and proposing hypothetical mechanisms that, if they existed, would generate 
or cause those observations; and b) choosing between these mechanism (or identifying the most likely 
combination of mechanisms) based on their ability to describe the necessary conditions for the 
observed phenomena [8,39]. Precisely how this should be done is inadequately discussed within the 
critical realist literature, which tends to be much stronger on ontology than on epistemology and 
methodology.9 But it commonly involves asking ‘characteristically realist questions’ such as: What 
makes X possible? What properties must exist for X to be what it is? What does the existence of this 
object or practice presuppose? Could object A exist without B? [48]. A key feature of this process is 
the assessment of whether particular mechanisms are necessary to explain the observations or merely 
contingent to those observations [48].  
 
This emphasis on necessity and contingency appears to be lacking within the MLP, which exhibits a 
tendency to include an increasing number of mechanisms and ideas within the overarching 
framework. This is evident in the multiple extensions and modifications to the MLP and in the 
numerous proposals for ‘enriching’ the MLP with different theoretical ideas. The MLP began life as a 
highly ambitious synthesis of evolutionary economics, science and technology studies, structuration 
theory and neo-institutional theory [2], but has since been supplemented (or proposed to be 
supplemented) with ideas from political economy [87], political ecology [88], political science [89], 
reflexive governance [90], multilevel governance [91], cultural sociology [92], discourse analysis [93], 
geography and regional studies [83,94], social movement theory [95], dynamic capabilities [96], 
ambidextrous organisations [97] and numerous other areas.  
 
There are drawbacks to this trend. First, the breadth of ideas is sufficiently wide that only a particularly 
talented researcher could hope to employ even a subset of them within a single empirical study. 
Second, the ratio of theoretical propositions to available evidence is likely to be unworkable, 
particularly when relying solely upon secondary data. Third, the trend to add to rather than subtract 
from the framework neglects the possibility that many processes and mechanisms could be of 
secondary or no importance in particular transition processes, and may therefore be ignored in those 
cases. Fourth, the inclusion of an increasing number of theoretical ideas complicates the validation of 
individual propositions. As Kirser observes: "… It is very difficult to test the validity of a narrative 
containing loosely connected bits of arguments from a variety of theories…” [98] 
 
As an example, consider Geels [30] account of the electrification of US factory production, which 
involved the stepwise integration of a series of innovations in machine tools, building materials, 
                                                          
9 Reference is commonly made to choosing between theories on the basis of their relative ‘explanatory power’, 
but this criteria has proved difficult to define and operationalise [86]. For example, Bhaskar provides the rather 
vague suggestion that: "… A theory Tc is preferable to a theory Td… provided that Tc can explain under its 
descriptions, almost all the phenomena that Td can explain under its descriptions, plus some significant 
phenomena that Td cannot explain..”[7].  
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materials handling technologies, power generation, power distribution, lighting and other areas. As 
with most MLP studies, this is a richly descriptive account of multiple developments at the niche, 
regime and landscape levels, but gives little consideration to whether particular events and processes 
were necessary for the transition to occur. For example, it could be argued that several of the 
highlighted developments - such as the professionalization of engineers, laissez-faire economic 
policies, cultural enthusiasm for electricity, the use of electric trams in cities, the rise of the ‘efficiency’ 
movement - were secondary developments and hence not necessary for the transition to occur. But 
Geels’ narrative provides no way of assessing the necessity or contingency of those events and 
processes, or whether one should be considered more important than another.  
 
Methods for dealing with such limitations are widely used within the social sciences [99], but not 
within transition studies. One approach is to develop counterfactuals, with the aim of assessing 
whether the absence or modification of a particular event or process would have led to a significantly 
different outcome. Although such exercises are necessarily hypothetical, much can be learned by 
systematically thinking through the theoretical and empirical issues involved [37,100].10 A key 
difficulty with developing counterfactuals for MLP case studies, however, is that causality is assumed 
to result from multiple mechanisms and events that combine in different ways over very long periods 
of time. This combination of interdependence and sequence makes counterfactuals hard to construct 
[99]. 
 
An alternative approach would be to compare two or more case studies: for example, investigate the 
electrification process in another context where particular conditions or processes were not present 
or in a context where they were present but the outcomes were different [101,102]. Although most 
comparative methods derive from positivist research traditions, their use is compatible with critical 
realism [40,77,100,103]. But again, since the geographical and temporal scope of sociotechnical 
transitions is greater than in most social scientific research, the application of comparative methods 
is challenging. One could potentially conduct cross-country comparisons, but the number of relevant 
differences at the niche, regime and landscape levels could easily make this unworkable.  
 
A third approach would be to investigate the potential for agent-based or system dynamic modelling 
of transition processes [104]. Although these are reductionist tools, they can also incorporate 
structural factors that enable and constrain behaviour, together with learning processes. Hence, these 
could potentially deliver useful insights into the dynamics of transitions, including whether bottom-
up processes are sufficient to explain observed outcomes. But once again, the complexity, scope and 
duration of sociotechnical transitions present a challenge - and more generally, stretch the bounds of 
feasible causal explanation. 
Processes and narratives  
Another way of understanding the MLP is to view it as a ‘process’ rather than a ‘variance’ theory (Table 
6). This distinction derives from the work of organisational theorists such as Poole et al [105] and 
Abbott [106]: 
 
                                                          
10 Fearon argues that: "… the common condition of too many variables and too few cases makes 
counterfactual thought experiments necessary means for justification of causal claims…" [101]. 
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"…There are two ways of seeing….historical processes more generally. One focuses on 
stochastic realisation and aims to find causes; the other focuses on narratives and aims to find 
typical patterns…"[106] 
 
The second of these approaches has influenced the MLP: 
“….the MLP employs ‘process theory’ as explanatory style rather than ‘variance 
theory’….Process theories do not explain variance in the dependent variable as ‘caused’ by 
independent variables, but instead explain outcomes in terms of event sequences and the 
timing and conjunctures of event-chains…..Depending on the research topic and question, 
these can be micro-events such as moves and counter-moves by actors, or they can be macro-
events ….” [63] 
Table 6 Process versus variance theories 
Variance approach Process approach 
Fixed entities with varying attributes. 
Variables do the acting 
Entities participate in events and change 
identity over time. Actors do the acting 
Attributes a single meaning over time Entities, attributes and events may change in 
meaning over time 
Time ordering among independent 
variables is immaterial 
Time ordering of events is critical 
Generality depends on uniformity across 
contexts (laws) 
Generality depends on versatility across 
cases (variations within overall patterns) 
Source: [105,107] 
Process theory sees the world as comprised of ‘entities’ that participate in ‘events’, although the 
interpretation of these terms may differ from critical realism [105,107]. Explanation then depends 
upon identifying critical events and conjunctions of events. The focus is on temporal sequences - how 
one event leads to and influences subsequent events. But this implies that process theory focuses 
upon the empirical level rather than real structures and mechanisms. Events are relevant to causal 
explanation, but for critical realists a focus upon events alone is insufficient. For example, the 
introduction of supportive regulations (an event) may have accelerated the diffusion of cars, but to 
fully understand and explain this event (why did it happen?) and its consequences (why did it have 
these results?), it is necessary to dig deeper and identify the nature and mode of operation of the 
underlying structures and mechanisms - such as the motivations of different interest groups and the 
processes of coalition formation and lobbying. As Lawson notes:11 
“…..the world is composed not only of ‘surface phenomena’ such as skin spots, puppies 
turning into dogs, and relatively slow productivity growth in the UK, but also of 
                                                          
11 Similarly, Popora observes: "… Critical realism does not completely rule out talk of events causing other events. 
In the event that the baseball, flying through the air, breaks a window, it could be said that the one event caused 
the other. But more fundamental than events are the ontological particulars involved….and their causal 
properties. It is the hardness of the ball, its projectability, and its momentum that gives it the power to break, 
and the brittleness of the window that disposes it to breaking… In each case the causal powers of the particular 
derive from its essential properties which in turn derive from its internal structure…"  [49] 
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underlying and governing structures and mechanisms such as ... viruses, genetic codes 
and the British system of industrial relations …..” [40] 
Indeed, despite the influence of process theory, the MLP case studies do highlight multiple interacting 
causal mechanisms. The problem is more the explanatory status of these vis a vis event sequences 
and the overarching framework – with the latter appearing to take priority.  
The MLP has also been termed a form of ‘narrative explanation’ [63,100,106,108] - a term used within 
historical sociology that has similarities with process theory: 
 "… narrative explanations take the form of an unfolding, open-ended story fraught with 
conjunctions and contingency, where what happens, an action, in fact happens because of its 
order and position in the story. Narrative therefore permits a form of sequential causation that 
allows for twisting, varied and heterogeneous time paths to a particular outcome …" [100] 
Narrative explanations combine description with interpretation, but their informality can make it very 
difficult to assess either the significance of different events or the comprehensiveness of the account. 
This problem can be mitigated through the use of more formal techniques such as event-sequence 
analysis [109,110], but these still focus upon events rather than underlying mechanisms. An 
alternative is event-structure analysis which "… forces the analyst to replace temporal order with her 
or his expert judgement or knowledge about causal connections…” [100]. However, these formal 
techniques have not been applied to transition studies and the complexity of the processes involved 
would make this difficult to do. Instead, causality is sought in the overall ‘plot’ provided by the MLP: 
“…..To develop causal narratives, explanations need be guided by ‘heuristic devices’ such as 
conceptual frameworks that specify a certain plot….The multi-level perspective provides such a 
plot for the study of transitions.…Although the specific event sequences of each (transition) are 
different, process theories such as…the MLP can claim versatility or generality when they are 
able to identify recurring causal patterns…..” [63] 
“….In process theory, the generality of explanations depends upon their versatility, the degree 
to which they can encompass a broad domain of developmental patterns without modification 
of their essential character. The broader its domain (the greater the variety of cases, contacts, 
events and patterns the theory can adapt to), the more general the explanation….” [76] 
In this formulation, the success of an empirical narrative lies not so much in the identification of 
operational causal mechanisms, but in the extent to which it can be interpreted in the light of a highly 
versatile theoretical framework that provides a ‘guiding plot’. But this provides no confidence that the 
plot is correct or that the causal mechanisms operating in particular cases or at particular points in 
time have been adequately identified and understood. Using versatility as a criterion for success 
creates the risk that the theory simultaneously explains everything and nothing. In practice, one would 
expect social entities and practices to be bounded in space and time and dependent upon ideas, 
institutions and physical structures that have only limited duration. Transitions entail structural 
changes both within and between social entities, so the relevance and relative importance of different 
causal mechanisms may be expected to change over time and between different situations. Good 
explanations may therefore be complex, contingent and specific, rather than universalising. 
24 
 
In sum, the implicit epistemology of the MLP has more in common with critical realism than with 
positivism, but there are some important tensions between the two. As with the ontological tensions 
discussed in Section 4, these derive as much from the ambition of the MLP to explain extremely 
complex processes that unfold over many decades as they do from its reliance upon particular 
assumptions or methodological tools. And as with the implicit ontology of the MLP, there may be 
sufficient ambiguity and flexibility in the framework to accommodate adjustments to make it more 
compatible with critical realism. 
6. Summary  
This article has sought to identify the foundational assumptions of the MLP and to assess their 
consistency with critical realism. In contrast to most studies in this area, the aim has not been to 
‘enrich’ the MLP with new theoretical ideas, or to apply the MLP to a particular empirical topic, but 
instead to draw attention to the strengths and weaknesses of its underlying assumptions. This has 
been achieved by comparing the implicit ontology and epistemology of the MLP to that endorsed by 
critical realism, and by making some suggestions on how the tensions between the two could be 
reduced. 
With regard to ontology, the MLP has been interpreted as claiming that sociotechnical systems 
represent social entities with emergent causal properties. But an adequate defence of this claim would 
require greater clarity about: the empirical boundaries of different sociotechnical systems; whether 
particular components, relationships and properties are necessary or contingent features of those 
systems; and whether particular causal properties are emergent features of those systems or simply 
the patterned outcome of ‘lower-level’ mechanisms - such as increasing returns. It would also be 
necessary to drop the distinction between system and regime, since this is confusing, ambiguous, and 
based in part upon an interpretation of social structure that appears incompatible with critical realism. 
Instead, it would be simpler to abandon the concept of sociotechnical regimes altogether and to refer 
solely to sociotechnical systems. The necessary relations between the constituent entities of these 
systems would then be sufficient to explain their associated causal properties. 
 
With regard to epistemology and methodology, both the MLP and critical realism share a rejection of 
the core assumptions of positivism, including the priority given to quantitative methods. But the 
application of the MLP creates a number of difficulties, including: a) the use of theory as a heuristic 
device rather than a causal explanation; b) the ambition to develop an extremely versatile framework 
rather than testing competing theories; c) the tendency to incorporate an increasing number of 
theoretical ideas, while at the same time paying insufficient attention to the necessity or contingency 
of particular mechanisms or events; d) the reliance upon single, historical case studies with little or no 
use of counterfactuals or comparative methods; e) the influence of ‘process theory’ that emphasises 
empirical events rather than underlying structures and mechanisms; and f) the neglect of 
‘reductionist’ methodologies such as agent-based and systems dynamic modelling that could 
potentially offer useful insights into transition processes. 
 
Taken together, these conclusions suggest that research employing the MLP could benefit from more 
critical reflection upon core assumptions, rather than further theoretical elaboration and that 
empirical work could benefit from a wider range of research methods. The necessity of alignments 
25 
 
between different mechanisms and processes needs to be demonstrated rather than assumed, 
together with the value of incorporating additional theoretical ideas. The goal of developing a versatile 
and widely applicable framework needs to be questioned; instead, the objective should be to explain 
the particular processes operating in particular situations. And if subsets of processes are considered 
sufficient to explain particular outcomes, the door may be opened to more focused studies using more 
limited range of theoretical ideas that provide more scope for validation. 
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